Despite appearances, the American political system is so complex, so hermetic, that anything can change overnight.

I’m an early riser. That day, I decided to have breakfast in a small coffee shop not far from where I live. I wanted to break the routine of my diet as too vegetarian so far. I did the right thing, because what I learned about the U.S. presidential election exceeded all my expectations. Analyses overshadowed the tragic situation in the Gaza Strip for a while. Clients with families, for the most part, abounded in analysis and speculations.

I was thrilled by syntheses drawn that would make the most astute American commentators blush. And this is not a joke. I, who spent a few years in Washington, DC, couldn’t believe it. A week later, two events took place: first, the assassination attempt on former President Donald Trump, running for a new term.  Then, President Joe Biden’s letter of renunciation from running for a second consecutive term while expected was surprisingly perceived as unusual. In this respect, Moroccan commentators proved to be as smart as good analysts.

On social networks, President Biden‘s letter of renunciation has been disseminated and shared, breaking all records. Then, a few articles written in a very convincing style have been published. They would keep American experts and academics speechless. All analyses converge on an almost certain victory for candidate Donald Trump.

The most cautious commentators, including myself, are careful not to accept what seems to be obvious, because this means shallowness and to-go-analysis. Common sense is against science; one of my former professors used to say. Do I doubt the outcome of these elections? I wouldn’t go that far, but my argument is that despite appearances, the American political system is so complex, so hermetic, that anything can change overnight. What are my arguments?

Tightrope walker, Scarecrow, and Enlightened Decision-Maker 

First, obviously, the U.S. elections have a big impact on intra-national and international political chessboards. In the United States, 90% of American voters think respectively of the economic, social, and political situation. Americans are not very interested in their country’s foreign policy unless it impacts their daily lives.

There have been exceptions in the past (First and Second World Wars, Korean, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan wars), which have had a relative impact on the outcome of the presidential elections. But overall, there was no decisive impact so to speak.

In the rest of the world, by contrast, a combination of external and internal factors to assess the American elections has been noticed. Intra-national alliances are being rethought to enable the actors to take a stand with respect to the new administration. Furthermore, foreign policy matters are being adapted to win momentum—at least for the two midterm years.

Secondly, the debate on the balance of power between the White House and Congress is brought in. These two institutions suffer pressures from a set of lobbyists (industrial-military complex, special interests of various kinds, emerging liberal forces, civil society, etc.). They deal with these lobbyists the best way they can. Inside this puzzle of mixed interests, one can single out what people schematically call the deep state, within which some of these interests are represented, and make the decision.

Third, in the United States, a gap between American political culture and the public mood has always kept unbiased observers speechless. Although the American voters are loyal to their affiliations with one or the other party (Democratic or Republican), the run-off often manages to reverse the trends. This is true not only for Swing States and undecided voters.

Fourth, in this context, if Kamala Harris’s nomination, as a potential Democratic Party candidate, is confirmed, the political culture and the public mood, as an element of analysis, will have to be scrupulously cross-examined.

Indeed, while the political culture generally accepts that women fill high-level positions in the administration, Congress, and private sector, the public’s mood is not yet ready to accept that the guest of the White House is a woman and even less a citizen of Latin American origin. The Barack Obama parenthesis may not happen in the foreseeable future.

Fifth, Kamala Harris is a minority woman. This presents both an opportunity and a handicap for her. But gender and social status are certainly less attractive to an electorate that watches the holders of true power in the United States. The latter are afraid of candidates suspected of being too liberal with a noticeable taste for left-wing ideology. This would apply, it seems, to Kamala Harris.

Sixth, during the 2016 presidential election, the factor that brought down candidate Hillary Clinton was the reluctance to see a woman become president. Certainly, foreign interference in the manipulation of public opinion did account, but not to the extent that one might think. Some might add that a couple of decisions the Obama administration took in the field of foreign policy would not have pleased certain spheres of the military-industrial complex. However, the gender factor played a determinant role.

Seventh, Kamala Harris’ fate is similar to that of Hillary Clinton. Both have served as vice presidents, and both have suffered an omnipresent president who delegates little decision-making power to them. Similarly, they were seen as the continuation of an administration that the majority of Americans, under the instigation (or manipulation) of diffuse interests, wanted to get rid of. Moreover, for the time being, the strategy of an unexpected candidate on the American political chessboard can no longer be an option.

Foreign policy is not American voters’ favorite dish

While domestic policy issues remain the most decisive factor in the 2024 presidential elections, the influence of foreign policy should not be completely discarded.

Eighth, Donald Trump’s style during the 2016-2020 term was characterized by preaching the false to get to the true. During his term, the United States has been less militarily interventionist. Between the isolationist, wait-and-see, and interventionist approaches, President Trump had opted for a balance between the three approaches depending on the context and the importance of the issue to be dealt with.

Ninth, if Donald Trump is elected, he will probably tackle the Ukrainian issue and relations with the Europeans, Russia, and China. But it will be less interventionist, contrary to what some experts may think.

Ukraine and Russia will be urged to agree on the basis of the new reality on the ground. The United States has no interest in seeing Russia collapse or Ukraine be a vassal to Russia. Pressure on NATO will resume, but without allowing Russia to win it all.

Tenth, however, European allies will have to work hard to regain US confidence. They did not stick to the script that was written to them. Flirting with Moscow to certain limits would have been tolerated. However, the Europeans have gone further. They have nurtured the hope of holding the stick in the middle to regain their independence along the way. The bet was a big setback.

Brexit was predictable, but not to the point of turning the European architecture upside down. While energy independence remains a legitimate demand, the way that Europeans have run the show has been less successful. First of all, vis-à-vis Russia and then vis-à-vis Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Qatar, to name but a few.

Subject to the American pressure and the solicitations of other gas producers, the Europeans have lost everything in the exchange. They aggravated their case by striking deals with China at a time when they should have been a little enthusiastic.

Certainly, the outgoing administration’s goal was to favor U.S. producers and remote control of the energy market, but the latter were unable to meet the level of refueling they had promised in exchange.

The natural gas market should no longer be subject to the imperative of traditional competition. It should be managed according to some form of parity. This parity is the only means capable of reaching economic recovery and the establishment of beneficial interdependence, even if a certain form of hierarchy of actors might be accepted.

Eleventh, the Middle East will not be accorded the importance it had in the years 2016-2020. Certainly, the aftermath of the war in Gaza will have some impact, but not to the point that would shake the conscience of American decision-makers or lead them to refrain from supporting Israel regardless of its actions in the occupied territories.

Twelfth, if a breakthrough is to be expected, it will be in line with the offer made during Trump‘s first mandate (2016–2020). For the sake of making good amends, pressures will be exerted to get Tel Aviv accept the two-state solution. These pressures would be applied, but not in the same proportion as that George H. Bush did on the eve of the Madrid Conference on Middle East Peace in 1991.

Thirteenth, expectations in the Arab world will not be met. Besides, in order to bring about some relief, the political leaders and academics will keep nurturing conspiracy theories at high speed. Obviously, one cannot rule out seeing the same commentators rehearsing Sykes-Picot’s story, the theory of regime change, or a new Arab Spring in progress.

Fourteenth, the Iranian nuclear issue will not be a priority insofar as the Iranians know where they stand with a president who puts his money where his mouth is. Moreover, they themselves are in a period of reshaping their political-religious chessboard, which imposes on them not to make fatal mistakes.

One thing is certain: the Iranian decision-makers’ room for maneuver in Arab affairs will be very limited. They are aware that if Donald Trump is elected, he will first focus on diplomacy before considering other options. Trump will be less interventionist than some observers might suggest. But he would be very harsh and uncompromising if the tolerated limits were exceeded.

For the time being, Iran can be proud of having saved the day, whereas a few months ago it was on the verge of losing its influence in the region. This could have been achieved if the strategy for resolving frozen and endemic conflicts in the neighboring sub-regions had been fully implemented. Likewise, it would have made a meaningful difference if the policy of getting rid of or shelving pariah movements and private paramilitary companies (created by state decision-making centers) was carried out.

Teheran would have seen its advanced proxy organizations in some Arab countries amputated or permanently neutralized. She had reportedly participated in the remote outbreak of the war in Gaza and in providing the Houthi in Yemen with means to have more bellicose scope. Teheran did so in the same way she enabled the Syrian regime to survive amid the Arab Spring in 2012.

Fifteenth, the fight against terrorism will always be a priority for the president-elect. Terrorism is a reality to be reckoned with. Terrorism is also a pretext for allowing the United States to use the economic sanctions as weapons to deter pariah states and “elevator states.” However, this needs more genuine international cooperation to cope with. 

Sixteenth, on the other hand, Donald Trump will probably try to put order in the relationship between the United States and the two Americas. If a new opening can be considered with respect to Cuba, an extended hand to Venezuela cannot be excluded.

Seventeenth, Donald Trump would be more flexible on the multilateral level. Whatever the electoral roadmap in this area he might come up with, he would give his administration time to consider more reasonable solutions with the United Nations system. But he would certainly call into question (or put on the back burner) the outgoing administration’s proposal to consider expanding the United Nations Security Council to include new permanent members representing Africa, Latin America, and Asia.

Eighteenth, tomorrow, I will go to have breakfast in the same coffee shop. I will indiscreetly eavesdrop to find out about the accuracy of the view experts in Maghreb affairs share, according to which Morocco will have everything to gain if Donald Trump is re-elected. But, to me, any other American candidate, regardless of their political color, will stick to commitments made to Morocco, which are in the best interest of the United States and North Africa.

Nineteenth, people feel the magnitude of the issue of the Sahara dispute. And they feel a little worried. I invite them to pour a drop of water into their “wine.” The recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara by the United States has been a reality since December 2020. The decision cannot be perceived as a domestic political issue for the United States.

With all due respect to the gravediggers on duty, this recognition is not a generous gift to praise Morocco’s beauty. It responds to the logic imposed by geopolitics and is rooted in the transformations that the international system is undergoing. The United States and a large number of countries worldwide have realized that the Southern Provinces are an existential issue for Morocco. They have taken the right decision accordingly.

However, one has to bear in mind that the United States is a great power that controls an international system that has become, in the aftermath of COVID-19, even more unipolar. It has become unipolar despite the geopolitical facelift introduced into its structure. The balance and reshuffle within different regional subsystems do not yet make it possible to relocate (or co-manage) global security in the same way it had been possible during the 1990s and 2000s.

Twentieth, as a result, the other Maghreb countries will be invited to review their roadmap in the perception of the changes underway. They will not be condemned but rather advised to jump on the bandwagon. But first they need to embrace a genuine change domestically.

Would it be a call for regime change? No, this means a process of adaptation and acceptance that the balance of power in the Maghreb subregion comforts actors who are evolving at a steady pace. Morocco is one of them. Morocco shows the same quiet strength despite the adversity she has been subjected to for decades.

In short, the US presidential elections will keep foreign commentators, but especially decision-makers worldwide, on the edge of their seats. However, if Donald Trump was elected, he would already be keen to work for a second term in 2024-2028. He would be focusing on domestic politics and not being too interested in foreign policy matters. He would pick two experienced persons: a Secretary of States and Secretary of Defense to get the job done.

Donald Trump would be keen to take revenge on those who worked so hard to discredit him—and even to create endless legal problems to take him down. He would do it less vehemently, but he would do it anyway.

What if Kamala Harris (or any other Democratic candidate) debunked the predictions? In politics, everything is possible. But what is possible is not wishful thinking. In any case, the next guest in the White House will give the most priority to domestic policy issues during the first midterm. The United States will need to get its confidence back mainly as a superpower that needs to get the record straight both on the domestic and foreign policy chessboards. But more appealing would be to heal the American society’s fear of losing it all.

Source : Moroccoworldnews